A Framework for the Automatic Discovery of Policy from Healthcare Access Logs by Paulett, John Michael
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE AUTOMATIC DISCOVERY OF POLICY 
FROM HEALTHCARE ACCESS LOGS
By
John M. Paulett
Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in 
Biomedical Informatics
August, 2009
Nashville, Tennessee
Approved: 
Professor Bradley Malin
Professor Dario Giuse
Professor Nancy Lorenzi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to deeply thank my advisor, Dr. Brad Malin, and my committee, Dr. 
Nancy Lorenzi and Dr. Dario Giuse, for their guidance and support of my master's 
research.  This research was funded in the past by NSF grant CCF- 0424422, the Team 
for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technologies.  I appreciate the assistance of Dr. 
Edward Shultz and the Vanderbilt Informatics Center in obtaining my degree.
This work has benefited from discussions with numerous members of Vanderbilt 
University, including Dr. Randolph Miller, Dr. Cynthia Gadd, Dr. Josh Peterson, Dr. 
Dominik Aronsky, Gaye Smith, Dr. Joshua Denny, Karen Hughart, and Dr. Nancy Wells.
The access logs used in this study were provide by Dr. Dario Giuse and David 
Staggs.  I also received data from Vanderbilt's Enterprise Data Warehouse.
This work was made possible by a number of open-source or free software tools, 
including: the Python language, the R language, ggplot2, numpy, matplotlib, NetworkX, 
Gliffy, and Jude. 
I thank the anonymous physicians who respondent to my survey as well as the 
RedCap survey system, funded by NCRR/NIH grant 1 UL1 RR024975.
Finally, I thank Laura Duvall for her support and assistance editing this 
manuscript.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................iii
LIST OF TABLES...............................................................................................................v
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................vi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................1
II. BACKGROUND.............................................................................................................5
Electronic Medical Record Systems & Security......................................................5
Government Regulation...........................................................................................7
Log Mining..............................................................................................................8
Process Mining & Workflow Analysis.....................................................................9
Conclusion.............................................................................................................10
III. HORNET SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE................................................................11
Introduction............................................................................................................11
HORNET Within An Existing HCO Infrastructure...............................................12
Software Description.............................................................................................13
Plugin Architecture................................................................................................15
Runtime Information..............................................................................................17
Development Information......................................................................................18
Future Plans...........................................................................................................19
IV. STATISTICAL MODEL OF THE ORGANIZATION FROM ACCESS LOGS.........21
Model Description.................................................................................................21
Modeling the Organization as a Relational Network.............................................21
Extracting the Relational Network from Access Logs...........................................25
Statistics from the Relational Network..................................................................26
Abstracting the Low-Level Network into a Generalized Network........................27
Implementing as HORNET Plugins.......................................................................29
iii
V. USAGE OF HORNET ON STARPANEL ACCESS LOGS.........................................31
Materials................................................................................................................31
Ignoring Users When Abstracting Relational Network....................................35
Results....................................................................................................................35
Interaction Probabilities....................................................................................38
Rule Decay........................................................................................................41
Sample Rules.....................................................................................................43
High Conditional Probability Rules..................................................................44
High Pair Probability Rules..............................................................................44
Low Conditional Probability Rules...................................................................45
Low Pair Probability Rules...............................................................................46
Discussion..............................................................................................................52
Limitations........................................................................................................53
VI. SURVEY OF EXPERT UNDERSTANDING OF ORGANIZATION........................56
Survey Methods.....................................................................................................56
Survey Design...................................................................................................56
Administration..................................................................................................57
Analysis.............................................................................................................58
Results....................................................................................................................59
Discussion..............................................................................................................63
VII. DISCUSSION & FUTURE WORK...........................................................................65
Next Steps..............................................................................................................67
Appendix
A. EXPERT SURVEY.......................................................................................................69
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................70
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1: HORNET Core Modules...................................................................................14
Table 2: Steps to Generate Relational Network..............................................................26
Table 3: Self-Assigned Roles for StarPanel Users..........................................................33
Table 4: 20 Department Rules with Highest Conditional Probabilities..........................47
Table 5: 20 Department Rules with Highest Conditional Probability That Existed 
at Least 3 Weeks................................................................................................48
Table 6: 20 Department Rules with the Highest Pair Probabilities.................................49
Table 7: 20 Department Rules with the Lowest Conditional Probabilities That 
Existed at Least 3 Weeks...................................................................................50
Table 8: 20 Department Rules with the Lowest Pair Probabilities That Existed at 
Least 3 Weeks....................................................................................................51
Table 9: Survey Results...................................................................................................61
v
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1: HORNET requires no changes to the existing HCO information system 
infrastructure...................................................................................................13
Figure 2: The modular design of HORNET allows easy extension...............................15
Figure 3: Example of HORNET's Plugin Chaining.......................................................17
Figure 4: Example of HORNET API Documentation....................................................20
Figure 5: Simple Example of Bipartite Graph...............................................................23
Figure 6: Bipartite Graph Converted to Relational Network.........................................23
Figure 7: Example Access Log.......................................................................................25
Figure 8: Pseudocode for Abstraction a Relational Network.........................................28
Figure 9: Sample of an Abstracted Relational Network.................................................29
Figure 10: Number of Accesses Across Time.  A periodic trend shows much 
greater system usage during weekdays as opposed to weekends...................34
Figure 11: Number of Departments and Users each week...............................................36
Figure 12: Patients accessed per user for the week starting April 23, 2006. All other 
weeks during the 21-week study period had a similar power law 
distribution......................................................................................................37
Figure 13: Number of rules each week at the User and Department levels.....................39
Figure 14: Rules per user for the week starting April 23, 2006. This distribution is 
consistent with the distributions seen for the other 20 weeks in our study 
period..............................................................................................................40
Figure 15: Decay of rules over time. 16% of the department rules existed for all 21- 
weeks of the study, while only 0.07% of the user rules lasted that long........43
Figure 16: Survey Responses versus Conditional Percentile...........................................60
vi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Healthcare Organizations (HCOs) are inherently complex bodies of clinicians and 
support staff working to provide care for patients (1; 2).  In addition to this inherent 
complexity, HCOs deal with constant change, whether adopting new protocols, reacting 
to legislated changes, providing care in emergency situations, or annually introducing 
new classes of medical students and residents. The complexity and constant change of the 
organizational structure and workflows makes HCOs difficult to accurately model using 
traditional techniques. This difficulty particularly stymies the efforts of HCO privacy 
officials who wish to increase system security and ensure patient confidentially by 
applying fine-grained access control systems to the electronic Health Information 
Systems (HIS) within the HCO, systems such as Electronic Medical Record Systems 
(EMRS).
When security experts discuss healthcare, they often suggest that healthcare 
systems use the security models introduced by the military and by the banking industry. 
These groups have effectively implemented security measures such as role-based access 
control (3; 4), in which users are assigned a role or set of roles, which determines his or 
her access to information. 
Unfortunately, these access control systems are not widely adopted by HCOs for 
several reasons. First, clinicians have an understandable fear of being encumbered by 
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inappropriately configured access rights, making it difficult to access critical patient 
information in a timely fashion, particularly in medical emergencies (3). Second, the 
organizational complexity of HCOs is incredibly difficult to capture accurately or 
completely using the traditional top-down approach of manually defining the access 
policy. In a typical top-down approach, security experts try to manually codify the 
allowed actions within the system, as well as assign these actions to the proper 
individuals.  Unfortunately, this type of modeling can suffer from issues of informant 
accuracy (5). Third, the dynamic nature of an HCO can quickly invalidate manually-
defined access policies.
Since the policy definitions of access control systems can be too burdensome for 
HCOs, many fall back to retrospective auditing of users' actions within the system (6). 
Unfortunately, auditing merely shifts the manual burden from upfront policy definitions 
to the massive task of combing through thousands or millions of user actions every day. 
In practice, auditing reduces to random spot checks and requested reviews.  Even at 
advanced institutions, consequently, the level of auditing sophistication is very basic.
 Currently, many clinical systems are essentially vulnerable to insider attacks 
(attacks in which the user has a legitimate right to access the system, but not necessarily 
rights to specific information within the system) (7).
The lack of adoption of access control systems or thorough auditing within HIS is 
due neither to inherent problems in these technologies nor to the lack of vendor 
implementations within HIS products.  Rather, this lack is caused by the inability to 
create appropriate policy definitions of what is normal and abnormal usage of the HIS. 
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In this work, we will demonstrate a novel tool that can model an HCO using a 
bottom-up approach.  Our approach constructs a statistical model of the HCO by 
analyzing the usage of a HIS through its access logs. 
To our knowledge, no work exists that attempts to mine policies from access logs 
in the HCO setting. Previous work, however, has demonstrated the viability of using 
access logs to characterize user behavior (8; 9). Additionally, the fields on which the 
methods are based, such as social networking and data mining, have a successful history 
of distilling data and providing meaningful results. 
Our methods and tool are designed so an HCO can generate a statistical model of 
its users' interactions.  This statistical model can form the basis of policy definitions and 
rules in a real-world access control system or auditing system.  Specifically, our work 
will feed into the efforts in model-based software platforms, such as Vanderbilt's Model-
Integrated Clinical Information System, a system that assists in the rapid development 
and evaluation of formal systems based on service oriented architectures (10; 11). These 
platforms have integrated robust privacy and security policy specification and validation 
languages, such as Stanford's logic based on contextual integrity (12). The statistical 
modeling technique presented in this paper provides the dynamic policies needed by 
these systems. 
In this thesis, we first cover the issues with existing solutions and explain how 
this work relates to other work in the field.  Second, we present an open-source 
framework, the Healthcare Organization Relational Network Extraction Toolkit 
(HORNET), that allows HCO officials to generate a statistical model based upon their 
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own information systems and allows researchers to build on top of our work. Third, we 
explain an approach that HORNET can use to generate a statistical model of how the 
organization works from the organization's access logs.  Using this approach, we next 
demonstrate HORNET by generating a statistical model from the access logs of 
Vanderbilt University Medical Center's (VUMC) EMRS, known as StarPanel. With a 
statistical model built from StarPanel's access logs, we conduct a pilot survey to 
demonstrate the experts' inability to model how the organization works.  We conclude this 
work by summarizing our findings and proposing the next logical steps of this research.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Electronic Medical Record Systems & Security
HCOs increasingly adopt Electronic Medical Record Systems (EMRS) as a means 
to improve quality while preventing errors (1; 2) and to reduce the cost of delivering care 
(13; 14). Initially believed to represent a massive step forward in terms of security when 
compared to the paper-based medical record, EMRSs instead shift the attack vectors (3). 
There is an ever increasing body of evidence of privacy violations conducted by 
insiders who, while authorized to use the EMRS, improperly access patient information. 
Numerous celebrities, including George Clooney, Britney Spears, and Farrah Fawcett, are 
victims of improper medical records access by valid EMRS users (15-17).  Although 
these high profile cases garner much media attention, there are likely dozens or hundreds 
of improper accesses that occur and are never caught. Some improper accesses are likely 
out of human compassion—wondering how a co-worker is doing during her stay in the 
hospital—but there are numerous cases of privacy violations for the sole purpose of 
conducting fraud (18; 19). 
A core benefit of an EMRS, centralization, allows providers from distant locations 
to view and contribute to a unique record for each patient. Centralization means that the 
records potentially could be protected by strict access control polices compared to paper 
records, which could lay exposed on a desk or a cart in a hallway. But, centralization also 
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implies that a breach of privacy can be carried out from a distance and almost instantly. 
Many researchers and security officials realize the security implications of an 
electronic record and propose solutions often based on successes in other industries. 
Barrows and Clayton stress the importance of healthcare policy informing security 
policies (3). Their work suggests implementing access control in EMRS, in which each 
user's permissions to access specific patient information is explicitly defined pre-hoc. 
Most interestingly, the authors point out the paradox that exists with healthcare data: the 
most private and sensitive data in a patient's record is often the most relevant data when 
treating that patient. Denley and Smith have similar sentiments about the use of access 
control in EMRS (20). They suggest that the access control should be based upon a user's 
role in the organization (nurse, clerk, junior doctor, radiologist, etc.) and the locations of 
their responsibility (by ward, specialty, etc.). They indicate several cases in which this 
model breaks, such as if a user legitimately needs to access the record of a patient who 
visited the ward beyond a certain time window. Furthermore, Denley indicates that any 
access control system for medical records needs to have a security override method. 
These researchers provide sound justification for using access control in healthcare 
systems, but they fail to address the practical issue of actually building the access control 
policies.
To a large extent, HCOs successfully adopt many standard information 
technology security protocols, such as encryption, digital signatures, firewalls, and user 
authentication. These measures are primarily designed to prevent unauthorized access, 
rather than to prevent the insider threat by enforcing rules on how users should be 
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allowed to interact with the data once they have a legitimate need to access the system. 
Unfortunately, this insider threat proves a greater and more costly challenge to HCOs  (7; 
21).
The typical method for preventing insider attacks,  role-based access control, used 
by the banking industry and the military, does not work well in the healthcare 
environment. In role-based access control, each user is assigned to a role. The roles are 
given the ability to conduct certain tasks within the system. These systems rely on a 
complete upfront definition of the access policy in terms of the users, roles, and tasks. 
Due to the highly dynamic and critical nature of healthcare, it is nearly impossible for 
privacy administrators to manually conduct this upfront or pre-hoc definition of policy 
within the system. The fear of being too strict in the access policies permeates healthcare. 
Providers are often unwilling to give up control when providing care to patients, 
especially in emergency situations.
Government Regulation
Until recently, the most prominent national legislation dealing with healthcare 
security and privacy was the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, known 
as HIPAA (22).  Within HIPAA, the Privacy Rule details the criteria for “protected health 
information,” how this information can be disclosed, and how improper disclosures are 
handled.  Also within HIPAA is the Security Rule, which indicates general safeguards for 
protecting healthcare data, including the use of auditing (§164.312(b)) and access control 
(§ 164.312(a)).  Unfortunately, these two rules, while mandating goals, lack specifics of 
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how these technologies should be implemented.  This lack of specificity puts the 
healthcare industry in a state of limbo—in which the industry acknowledges that its data 
must be secured, but lacks full, end-to-end security and privacy solutions.
While HCOs in the United States work to become HIPAA compliant, there have 
been few, if any, sanctions imposed for security or privacy lapses. But recently, 
government agencies have started pushing HCOs to comply with the legal codes by 
levying heavy sanctions (23).
In response to the ambiguous regulations of the past decade, the recent passage of 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, is expected to improve the regulation 
of HCO security (24).  As part of the act, HCOs must simultaneously improve adoption 
and security of electronic medical record systems.  The act seeks to improve security by 
forcing HCOs to monitor and publicly report any breaches of patient privacy.  This 
renewed regulatory interest in healthcare information security justifies the need for the 
work that we are presenting.
Log Mining
A fairly young, but rich history exists for mining system access logs. Much of the 
work in log mining parallels the growth of the Internet. Some of the early work in access 
mining comes from Cooley, Srivastava, and colleagues. They discuss pattern discovery 
from web server access logs (25; 26). They additionally hint at the use of association rule 
mining as a method for performing the pattern discovery. They also discuss methods for 
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preparing data, specifically with the intent of tracking user sessions (27). 
Based on these techniques, researchers have begun to successfully use log mining 
to discover patterns in human behavior.  From email logs of who sent and received email 
within Enron during the company's collapse, researchers can detect fundamental 
organizational changes (8; 28).
In the healthcare setting, access log mining is often conducted in connection with 
improving electronic education resources (29-31). The work of Chen et al. shows that 
mining EHRS access logs is useful for discovering clinicians' information needs (32). 
Additionally, Malin's research shows that patients' Internet browsing patterns on a health 
information site are correlated to those patients' medical diagnoses (9).  
The work of these researchers indicates the usefulness of access logs as a source 
of information about how users and organizations interact and change.  Our proposed 
research extends the field of log mining by applying this field's techniques for the 
purpose of generating security policies.
Process Mining & Workflow Analysis
The concept of process mining or workflow analysis in healthcare is explored by 
several groups (33). The study of workflows is especially important to healthcare because 
it can help detect and fix suboptimal processes in an effort to increase the quality of care 
(1). The cases of HCO workflow mining are often localized to a small group and focused 
on safety improvement measures, instead of HCO-wide privacy and security issues.
Outside healthcare, the study of workflows is also active, from the 
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characterizations of how workflows and organizations change over time (34) to advanced 
techniques to detect, model, and analyze workflows (35-37).  Unfortunately, many of 
these techniques only work for small datasets, and therefore are not suitable when 
analyzing a whole organization.
Conclusion
Our work comes at an opportune time.  There is an existing void in healthcare 
security, caused by the inability of traditional solutions to prevent insider attacks within 
HCOs. Unfortunately, this void is increasingly exploited as EMRSs become more 
prevalent.  With the public aware of this growing privacy issue, the government is 
actively pressing HCOs to close the security void.  In the coming chapters we will present 
a framework takes the first step towards addressing the current security void.
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CHAPTER III
HORNET SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
Introduction
One of the main contributions of this work is an open-source software platform 
(HORNET) for efficiently analyzing HCO access logs.  The design of HORNET includes 
two primary goals: reusability and extensibility.  
In order to be reusable, HORNET uses abstract concepts and allows 
administrators to configure mappings from the organization-specific details into these 
abstract concepts. For example, specifics of the access log format, such as delimiters and 
fields, are configured by the user.  Configuration of HORNET allows other HCO 
administrators and researchers to reuse HORNET to conduct the analysis presented in 
this thesis on their own information systems. In order to analyze small to large HCOs, 
HORNET must also perform its analysis efficiently.
In addition to being reusable, HORNET is extensible, so that developers can add 
or customize analysis techniques.  HORNET utilizes a plugin architecture, in which 
developers can take advantage of a rich Application Programming Interface (API).  This 
API allows quick development for additional features and analysis techniques.  Since 
HORNET is an open-source project, released under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (38), 
developers can safely extend and contribute to the platform.
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HORNET Within An Existing HCO Infrastructure
To facilitate the adoption of HORNET by other HCOs, we have designed it to 
seamlessly fit into the existing IT infrastructure of an HCO.  HORNET will accept access 
logs in nearly any format from any source IT system.  The access logs can be in a text 
format, such as comma- or tab-separated or XML.  Likewise, the access logs can be 
stored in any major relational database system, such as Oracle, MySQL, Postgres, DB2, 
Access, SQL Server, or SQLite.  The ability to accept multiple data formats comes from 
our abstracted model of an access log, with specific implementations that map XML, flat 
text, or relational database tables into abstract access events.  Once HORNET is installed 
and configured to the format of the access logs, the user can select which analyses he or 
she wishes to run, using a configuration language. As shown in Figure 1, HORNET sits 
on top of the existing HCO information technology infrastructure, thus no changes 
beyond obtaining log files is necessary for HORNET.  HORNET can optionally feed off 
of sources of meta-information about users—such as a user's role or department that is 
stored in traditional human resource databases.
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Software Description
The HORNET software platform, developed in the Python language (39) has two 
key pieces:  HORNET Core and the HORNET plugins (Figure 2).  The HORNET plugins 
each perform a specific task, usually involving some specialized method of analysis, 
while HORNET Core is a general framework on which the plugins run.  The Core 
additionally provides common functionality (e.g., file and database access), general data 
structures (e.g., graphs, nodes, and edges), and plugin configuration.  New plugins can be 
written for alternate analysis and use HORNET Core to remove much of the “grunt” 
work.
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Figure 1: HORNET requires no changes to the existing HCO information system 
infrastructure.
HORNET Core consists of a handful of modules that ease plugin development, 
shown in Table 1. HORNET Core also provides the “executable” that launches any 
desired analysis as well as the configuration mechanism to allow the user to specify what 
analysis is desired.  HORNET is capable of running on any modern operating system.
Table 1: HORNET Core Modules
Module Features
File API • Read/write delimited files, such as comma- or tab-separated data
• Create unique, temporary files
• Move & delete files
• Persist complex data structures to disk
Database API • Query major relational database products (including MySQL, Postgres, 
Oracle, SQLite, Access, SQL Server, and DB2)
• Wraps the functionality provided by the open-source SQLAlchemy1 
library
Network API • Basic data structures, such as a relational network, edge, and node
• Methods to manipulated and analyze these data structures
• Wraps the functionality provided by the open-source library NetworkX2 
Plotting API • Create common graphs, such as XY-plots or log-log plots 
• Wraps the functionality provided by matplotlib3 library
Task API • Run computationally intensive tasks in parallel, by taking advantage of 
multiple processors and multiple cores
Plugin API • Specification to which plugins must adhere
• Provides common utilities, such as logging
1 http://www.sqlalchemy.org/   
2 http://networkx.lanl.gov/   
3 http://matplotlib.sourceforge.net/   
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Plugin Architecture
On top of HORNET Core, we provide several plugins and allow for any 
additional plugins (Figure 2). The plugins must adhere to a basic contract which defines 
how they are notified that it is their turn to process data and how to return data once they 
are finished with their analysis.  Beyond this basic contract, the plugins can perform any 
type of operation a developer desires. The basic contract allows for plugin “chaining” in 
which the output of one plugin becomes the input of another plugin.  For example, one 
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Figure 2: The modular design of HORNET allows easy extension.
plugin can create a relational network object from a log file, HORNET Core then passes 
this relational network object to the plugins that are configured to wait for this data. As 
Figure 3 shows, the network object is passed to the Social Network Analysis plugin and 
the Network Abstraction plugin. Once these plugins finish their analysis, their output is 
appropriately piped to the next plugins.  The plugin chaining can become complex, 
allowing for forks in processing (i.e., multiple plugins can process the output of a single 
plugin) and for joining forks (i.e., forked execution threads can be rejoined into a single 
plugin). The plugins and the piping configuration are specified in a single configuration 
file, using a powerful configuration language, which is a subset of the Python language.
16
Figure 3: Example of HORNET's Plugin Chaining
Runtime Information
HORNET is designed to run efficiently, providing administrators or researchers 
results within a reasonable time frame. Since HORNET sits on top of the existing 
infrastructure, it can process data in an off-line, batch mode.
Many of the analyses that HORNET performs are CPU-intensive.  However, 
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HORNET can be memory-bound depending on the size of the dataset.  The memory 
required to store the data structures scales linearly with the number of relationships 
between users.  
We use several techniques to improve the runtime of HORNET.  First, the data 
structures and algorithms are optimized to reduce the size of objects in memory and the 
number of computations required (further optimization is very likely possible). Second, 
the Task API allows parallel computation.  We use the Task API to analyze multiple time 
periods in parallel. Third, if memory is an issue, HORNET can be configured to run in 
several steps, in which intermediate results are persisted to disk. 
As a point of reference, the retrospective study presented in Chapter V, which 
analyzes 21 weeks of access logs from VUMC, takes less than 12 hours on a machine 
with a dual core processor and 4 gigabytes of memory.
Development Information
HORNET is a command-line application, which is programmed in Python, and 
currently optimized for Python version 2.6.  The application consists of over 6,600 lines 
of source code, more than half of which are unit tests and functional tests to ensure the 
validity of the logic.  Over 93% of all code statements are unit tested.  The code contains 
in-file documentation, including sample use of the code, to assist plugin developers.
As an open-source program, we provide a public, version-controlled, source 
repository on Google Code4.  Third-party developers are encouraged to submit changes 
4 http://code.google.com/p/hornet/source/browse/    
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using the Mercurial version-control tool.  We also host an issue tracker on Google Code5, 
to which we encourage the submission of bug reports and feature requests. 
Upon every commit to the source code repository, our continuous integration 
server executes all the unit and functional tests and rebuilds the searchable 
documentation6.  This documentation is built from the in-file documentation and 
examples as well as from supplementary files detailing how to use, install, and develop 
HORNET (Figure 4).  If a commit causes a test to fail, the developers are notified via 
email, so that a prompt fix can occur.
We selected a permissive open-source license, the Apache License 2.0, which 
allows any HCO to use and extend HORNET.
Future Plans
HORNET's open nature, both in terms of its licensing and its plugin architecture, 
means that other developers and researchers can be part of the future direction of 
HORNET.  We specifically plan several major enhancements, including a graphical user 
interface.  We are also in active development of other plugins.  These plugins will 
experiment with different units of analysis and different methods of analysis. 
Additionally, we plan to develop a plugin that uses the statistical model we present in the 
following chapters to characterize if the accesses of individual users are suspicious. 
5 http://code.google.com/p/hornet/issues/list   
6 http://hiplab.mc.vanderbilt.edu/projects/hornet/snapshot/docs/   
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Figure 4: Example of HORNET API Documentation
CHAPTER IV
STATISTICAL MODEL OF THE ORGANIZATION FROM ACCESS LOGS
Model Description
Our goal is to obtain a statistical model, which describes the interactions and 
relationships of providers within the HCO based upon their common interactions with 
patients, from the access logs of an EMRS. This model characterizes how the 
organization works by using the EMRS as a proxy for normal processes and operations 
within the HCO. We will first discuss the basics concepts of our relational network 
model, then cover how to build this model from access logs.  We use the HORNET 
framework discussed in the previous chapter to create a plugin that builds this statistical 
model.
Modeling the Organization as a Relational Network
The techniques we present are rooted in the social networking community, which 
has a rich history of modeling and analyzing bodies of people (40).  This history includes 
the famous small world experiments of Milgram and Traver that shows that any two 
people in the United States are separated, on average, by only 6 other people (41; 42). 
Recent re-creations of Milgram's study show similar results for the connections of users 
of instant messenger systems (43) and blog links (44). In the field of Biomedical 
Informatics, social network techniques are valuable in understanding the structure of 
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editorial boards of journals in the field (45) and in characterizing the focus of 
departmental research interests (46).
The basic unit of analysis of social networking is a user, also called a node, and 
represented as n. Two nodes can be connected by an edge, labeled e. The set of all nodes, 
N, and set of all edges, E, exist within the network (also called a graph), G.  In G, an 
edge, ex,y, exists between two nodes, x and y, if those users accessed at least one patient's 
record in common. We denote the distinct number of patients a user has accessed by |n| 
and the number of patients two users accessed in common by |ex,y|. Finally, we keep track 
of how many distinct patients in total exist as |G|.  
We can examine a trivial example, as shown in Figures 5 and 6. Imagine there are 
three users, who access a total of four patients' records.  We initially show these two 
classes of people in a traditional bipartite graph (Figure 5).  Our goal is to transform the 
bipartite graph into a relational graph (Figure 6), in which the patients become a property 
of the relationships or edges between users.  User A is the only person to access Patient 1, 
so |User A|=1. User B accesses Patients 2, 3, and 4, thus |User B|=3.  User C accesses 
Patients 3 and 4, thus |User C|=2.  The total number of patients in the network, |G|, is 4. 
Since Users B and C accessed two patients in common, there is an edge between their 
two nodes, with |eUser B, User C|=2.
22
Figure 5: Simple Example of Bipartite Graph
Figure 6: Bipartite Graph Converted to Relational Network
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From this rather simple relational network construct, we can compute several 
interesting metrics and statistics. Using a similarity metric, such as the cosine distance 
(47), we can quantify the strength of relationship between two edges, with respect to their 
other relationships.  We compute the cosine similarity as:
similarity=
∣ex , y∣
∣x∣2∣y∣2
Thus, for each node, we can rank-order that node's edges, essentially providing us 
a list of strength of “friendship.”  It is important to note that when we use the words 
“friendship” or “relationship” we mean purely from the perspective of the relational 
network.  It is very likely that in the actual organization two people who are in a common 
care pathway may never know each other, yet they are connected from our perspective 
because they care for the same patients.
In addition to similarity, we can compute several probabilities related to the user 
accessing a record.  We refer to the probability of a patient's record being accessed by two 
specific users, such as x and y, as the pair probability, and compute it as:
P x , y =
∣e x , y∣
∣G∣
The conditional probability is the probability of a patient's record being accessed 
by a certain user, y, given that the record is accessed by a certain different user, x:
P  y∣x= P x , y
∣x∣/∣G∣
=
∣ex , y∣
∣x∣
In the conditional probability equation, we refer to x as the antecedent and y as the 
consequent. We sometimes refer to the relationship between x and y as the rule between x 
and y.
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Extracting the Relational Network from Access Logs
In order to create this relational network of the HCO, we need system access logs. 
Nearly all Health Information Systems generate access logs for the purpose of generating 
an auditing trail of what information providers see and what actions they take.  The 
access logs may be stored as plain text, XML, or within a database. We can build our 
model using either files or a database with the same approach, but for simplicity we will 
just refer to them as files. Typically, each line of the file represents a single action in time 
by a user as demonstrated in Figure 7. A line should contain at the very least a timestamp 
of when the action occurred, a unique identifier of the user performing the action, and a 
unique identifier for the patient. The line may have additional information that is relevant 
to the EMRS, such as the client's IP address and the action taken by the user.
Figure 7: Example Access Log
With the timestamp, user identifier, and patient identifier from the access logs, we 
construct the relational network according to the steps in Table 2.  If desired, we can 
partition the access log entries based upon some time-period, such as 7-days, and create 
individual networks for each time period.
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Timestamp User ID Patient ID Client IP Page Accessed
01/01/2006 02:23:47 drsmith 012345 10.127.0.1 view.cgi
01/01/2006 02:24:02 drsmith 999999 10.127.0.1 view.cgi
01/01/2006 02:24:03 drjones 012345 10.127.0.2 view.cgi
01/01/2006 02:38:00 drsmith 012345 10.127.0.1 view.cgi
...
Table 2: Steps to Generate Relational Network
Step
1 Create an empty network, G. 
2 Find the number of distinct patients, set this number into |G|.
3 For each user, n, create a list of patients that user accessed. |n| = size of 
this list. Insert n into G.
4 For each possible pair of users, x and y, find the intersection of their lists. 
|ex,y| = size of this intersection. In G, connect x and y with an edge, ex,y.
Statistics from the Relational Network
After using the steps in Table 2 to generate a relational network, we can easily 
compute the pair and conditional probabilities using the equations we previously defined. 
A high pair probability for this edge would indicate that this is a very common 
relationship within the HCO, such that a large number of patients are accessed by both 
providers. High pair probabilities indicate that the users are likely in high volume care 
areas. However, given the typical delivery of care by all but the smallest HCOs, it is 
unlikely that any set of users will have relatively large pair probabilities. For example, in 
order for an edge to have a pair probability of 0.10, both users must access at least 1 in 
every 10 patients.
While the pair probability is useful for putting each relationship in perspective to 
all the other relationships, the conditional probability gives a more local view of the 
relationships and allows us to find strong relationships that may by rare according to the 
pair probability.  For example, two users may be part of an workflow in a care area that 
only sees a handful of patients in a week.  The pair probability of this edge will be 
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function m(n) 
return the list of meta-information mappings of n
Create new network, G', with |G'| = |G|.
For each node, n, in G,  find m(n)
If m(n) is empty, ignore n and continue
Else for each n' in m(n)
If n' already exists in G', add |n| / size(m(n)) to |n'|
Else insert n' into G', with |n'|=|n| / size(m(n))
For edge, ex,y, in G, find m(x) and m(y)
If m(x) or m(y) is empty, ignore e and continue
Else for each x' in m(x) and y' in m(y)
If ex',y' already exists in G', add |ex,y| / (size(m(x)) * size(m(x))) to |ex',y'|
Else insert ex',y' into G', with |ex',y'|=|ex,y| / (size(m(x)) * size(m(x))) 
dwarfed by other edges representing groups such as the emergency department who 
likely see dozens to hundreds of patients a day. 
This relational network and statistical model is simple, yet powerful for reducing 
the huge amount of data that access logs provide into likelihoods of seeing certain events 
within the EMRS.
Abstracting the Low-Level Network into a Generalized Network
While examining how specific providers interact within the system is informative, 
this provider-level model can be very brittle when modeling modern HCOs due to the 
way in which providers act in roles and teams. For instance, if a patient is being treated in 
an Intensive Care Unit, it may be more informative to know that a critical care nurse 
accessed the record than to know the particular identity of the nurse.  Understanding who 
the providers are at an abstracted level empowers our model to make broader 
generalizations of the HCO.  
Additionally, these abstractions could potentially smooth volatility from the 
model. For example, several nurses and fellows may perform the same actions on the 
same set of patients but work at different times of the day. At the user level, we will 
detect different clusters of relationships depending on the time of day.  But if we abstract 
the data appropriately, we could remove the time factor to study true care roles.
We can construct abstracted versions of the relational network if, in addition to 
the access logs, we have a mapping of the users to some generalization, such as their 
department (Critical Care, Medicine, Oncology, etc.) or their role (fellow, nurse, biller). 
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function m(n) 
return the list of meta-information mappings of n
Create new network, G', with |G'| = |G|.
For each node, n, in G,  find m(n)
If m(n) is empty, ignore n and continue
Else for each n' in m(n)
If n' already exists in G', add |n| / size(m(n)) to |n'|
Else insert n' into G', with |n'|=|n| / size(m(n))
For edge, ex,y, in G, find m(x) and m(y)
If m(x) or m(y) is empty, ignore e and continue
Else for each x' in m(x) and y' in m(y)
If ex',y' already exists in G', add |ex,y| / (size(m(x)) * size(m(x))) to |ex',y'|
Else insert ex',y' into G', with |ex',y'|=|ex,y| / (size(m(x)) * size(m(x))) 
We refer to this type of information about users as “meta-information.” The abstraction 
process (Figure 8) takes in a relational network and returns a new relational network 
where nodes are at the generalized level and the edges between these generalized nodes 
represent the combined edges of the constituent user-level nodes.  If the generalization 
mappings indicate that a user has more than one generalization (e.g. an attending 
physician has appointments to two distinct departments), we discount the user's 
contribution to the abstracted edges and nodes proportional to the number of 
generalizations for that user. 
Figure 8: Pseudocode for Abstraction a Relational Network
As an example in performing an abstraction, we will use the sample relational 
network in Figure 6. Let us define the meta-information mapping such that User A has no 
mapping, User B maps to Dept 1 and Dept 2, and User C maps to Dept 3. Using the 
algorithm in Figure 8, we discount the nodes and edges of User B since User B has two 
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function m(n) 
return the list of meta-information mappings of n
Create new network, G', with |G'| = |G|.
For each node, n, in G,  find m(n)
If m(n) is empty, ignore n and continue
Else for each n' in m(n)
If n' already exists in G', add |n| / size(m(n)) to |n'|
Else insert n' into G', with |n'|=|n| / size(m(n))
For edge, ex,y, in G, find m(x) and m(y)
If m(x) or m(y) is empty, ignore e and continue
Else for each x' in m(x) and y' in m(y)
If ex',y' already exists in G', add |ex,y| / (size(m(x)) * size(m(x))) to |ex',y'|
Else insert ex',y' into G', with |ex',y'|=|ex,y| / (size(m(x)) * size(m(x))) 
department abstractions, as shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Sample of an Abstracted Relational Network
Implementing as HORNET Plugins
We implement this approach using HORNET's plugin framework.  To build the 
network graph, we use a File or Database Network Builder plugin, which reads the access 
logs.  As it inserts nodes and edges into the network, it begins calculating the pair and 
conditional probabilities of each edge.  Once complete, HORNET pipes the resulting 
network objects to any plugins configured to receive the Network Builder's results.  
One such receiver is the Network Abstraction plugin, which connects to a pre-
configured data source of meta-information.  Using this data source, the plugin joins 
nodes that have common meta-information (e.g., the same department).  When the join 
occurs, the plugin appropriately joins any associated edges and re-computes the edge 
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probabilities. Once the abstraction is complete, HORNET passes the abstracted network 
object onto any plugins configured to receive its output.
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CHAPTER V
USAGE OF HORNET ON STARPANEL ACCESS LOGS
In Chapters III & IV we introduced a framework for mining healthcare access 
logs then, using this framework, built specific methods for representing and analyzing the 
data in these access logs. In this chapter, we demonstrate these techniques by analyzing 
access logs from Vanderbilt University Medical Center's (VUMC) EMRS. Specifically, 
we present results on how users and departments interact within VUMC, and we 
demonstrate how inherent organizational structure makes examining the organization in 
an abstracted manner more appropriate.  Additionally, we discuss issues in using data 
from real-world information systems such as incomplete data.
Materials
We wish to use the plugins presented in Chapter IV to build a relational network 
that characterizes the probabilities of clinicians caring for the same patient using data 
from VUMC's EMRS, StarPanel.  VUMC is a large, tertiary care hospital located in 
Nashville, Tennessee.
VUMC has developed a custom longitudinal medical record system, StarPanel 
(48-50), based upon the MARS clinical repository, originally developed at the University 
of Pittsburgh (51).  StarPanel is a web-based system, which employs a number of servers 
that users access through a web browser.  These servers track usage of the system by 
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writing a summary of each action a user takes within the system to a log file.  These log 
files provide an auditing capability, however, as discussed in Chapter II, the task of 
manually auditing each action is monumental.  Each audit event stored in these logs 
consists of a timestamp, the user's information (username and Internet Protocol address), 
and information on the resource the user accessed (e.g., server file and patient medical 
record number).
We obtained a 21-week sample of the StarPanel access logs, dating from January 
1st, 2006, to May 27th, 2006.  These logs are consistently de-identified with pseudonyms, 
such that each instance of a unique username, IP address, and medical record number is 
globally replaced with a random ID number.  This approach to de-identification removes 
all identifiable information, while preserving the patterns and context within the log files. 
In this 21-week sample of data, 9,940 distinct StarPanel users accessed the records of 
350,889 distinct patients, resulting in a total of 7,575,434 accesses of patient information.
In addition to the StarPanel access logs, we sought to obtain meta-information 
about the StarPanel users—information such as the user's role (e.g., physician, nurse, 
etc.) and the user's department (e.g., Internal Medicine, Radiology, etc.).  Several sources 
each provide some subset of this meta-information, but none represent a consistent, 
universal dataset that provides information about the users. One source, StarPanel, 
maintains simple role information for customization of StarPanel based upon a user's 
self-identified role.  Each user has one of seven roles assigned, shown in Table 3. 
Unfortunately, a large number of users lack a specific role (they are given the role of 
“??”).  This lack of universal identification of role within StarPanel does not represent an 
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issue with StarPanel, but rather an issue caused by trying to use the data for a secondary, 
unintended use.  A second source of meta-information is the several distinct databases 
Vanderbilt maintains about clinicians.  Information about medical students, residents, and 
attending physicians is stored in separate databases.  In addition to the information being 
in separate physical databases, the information within these databases is not consistent. 
For instance, the labels for the same departments were often completely different between 
databases. The rationale for keeping this information separate is valid, since these 
populations have intrinsic differences, but it does create issues when trying to use the 
information for a secondary purpose as we intend in this study.
Table 3: Self-Assigned Roles for StarPanel Users
StarPanel 
Role
Number 
of Users
RN 3471
?? 2521
MD 1089
AT 945
AN 812
MR 451
MS 377
Ultimately, we use a single source of this meta-information, a database of 
physicians, nurses, and administrative users, located in VUMC's Enterprise Data 
Warehouse (EDW). From this database, we link the department of a user to that user's 
accesses.  This database contains department information on 3,687 users, 36.9% of the 
9,940 distinct users during our study period.  We will discuss the impact and implications 
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of using only this single provider database later.
We configure HORNET to connect to an Oracle 10g database, which stores the 
de-identified access logs and this departmental information.  We import the access logs 
into a database as opposed to building the relational model straight from the raw text log 
files to improve our ability to query the data. Once configured, HORNET processes the 
access log data using the plugin described in Chapter IV.  Specifically, we configure 
HORNET to  detect changes over time by analyzing the data in 21 one-week segments, 
split on midnight on Saturday.  We determined that one week segments were appropriate 
due to the periodic nature of system usage as shown in Figure 10.  
Figure 10: Number of Accesses Across Time.  A periodic trend shows much greater 
system usage during weekdays as opposed to weekends.
For each week, HORNET builds a relational network using the access log data 
from that week.  Using HORNET's plugin piping system, we route the results of the 
Network Builder to the Network Abstraction plugin, so that the user-user relational 
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network is abstracted into a department-department relational network, using the 
department information from the EDW database.  We then route the output of the 
Network Builder and Network Abstractor plugins to several plugins that compute various 
general statistics on the relational network.  These general statistics include the number of 
relationships in the network. 
Ignoring Users When Abstracting Relational Network
When performing the abstraction of the network, HORNET ignores the 63.1% of 
users who lack department information.  We will discuss the implications of the removal 
later, but we believe we are justified:  the two populations (those with departmental 
information and those without departmental information) have statistically 
indistinguishable patterns of accessing patient information. A Mann-Whitney U test 
rejected the null hypothesis that the two groups are different in terms of how many 
records each user in the two groups accessed, with a p < 0.001. Additionally, when we 
compare the a complete version of the user-level network to a version with all users who 
lack department information filtered out, we see that the ranks of the remaining rules do 
not change in relational to each other. So removing the users still keeps a meaningful sub-
network.
Results
Using HORNET to transform the access logs into a relational network allows us 
to examine some basic properties of the way in which Vanderbilt clinicians operate. We 
can see that the number of users accessing patients' records in StarPanel is consistent 
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throughout the 21-week study period (Figure 11), with an average of 6,406 users per 
week and a standard deviation of 126.  Relatedly, the average number of departments 
each week is 292 with a standard deviation of 4.5.  
Figure 11: Number of Departments and Users each week.
While the system usage is consistent, we see a huge variation in the number of 
patients' medical records a clinician accesses, as Figure 12 indicates.  If we look at the 
week of April 23, 2006, arbitrarily picked from our 21-week sample, we can see that 861 
of the 6,389 users accessed only a single patient's medical record, while one user 
accessed 1,097 records.  The number of records accessed by a user in one week on 
average is 28.8, with a median of 11.  The distribution of the number of patients accessed 
by each user appears to follow a power-law distribution, a property that is often seen in 
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social networks.  
This distribution indicates that a large number of users interact with only a few 
patients' medical records each week, while a small number of StarPanel “power users” 
access hundreds of patients' records.  We can confirm this concept of “power users” by 
examining the job titles of those users who were on the upper end of this distribution. 
The user who accessed 1097 patients' records is a medical records analyst in the 
Emergency Medicine department.  The person who accessed the second most patients in 
the week of April 23rd, is a coding specialist.  Both of these users have jobs that entail 
accessing the medical records of numerous patients.
Figure 12: Patients accessed per user for the week starting April 23, 2006. All other 
weeks during the 21-week study period had a similar power law distribution.
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Interaction Probabilities
Moving beyond these simple network statistics, we can look at the rules, which 
form the basic probability model for the likelihood of users and departments accessing 
common patients.  As Figure 13 shows, the number of rules detected each week is 
extremely consistent.  In terms of user-user probabilities, we detect on average 886,784 
rules per week, with a standard deviation of 48,972.  There is an upper limit to how many 
of these user-user relationships are possible, given by n
2−n
2
, where n is the number of 
users.  Using the average number of users per week, 6406, we find an upper limit of 
20,515,215.  With only 4.32% of all possible relationships, we see that the user-level 
network is relatively sparse—indicating the possibility of community structure withing 
the organization.
If we look at the abstraction of these user-user rules into department-department 
rules, we detect 27,261 rules on average per week with a standard deviation of 862. 
There is also an upper limit to the number of department-department relationships, given 
by n
2−n
2
n , where n is the number of departments.  We add an additional n in this 
equation because it is possible for departments to have relationships to themselves. Using 
the average number of departments per week, 292, the upper limit is 42,778.  We discover 
63.7% of the possible department relationships, indicating a greater amount of cross-
community relationships at the department-level than we see at the user-level.
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Figure 13: Number of rules each week at the User and Department levels.
When we examine the distribution of relationships per user for the week of April 
23rd  (Figure 14), we discover that it roughly follows a power law distribution.  This 
highly skewed distribution has an average of 139 rules per user and a median of 77.  The 
distribution shows that there are certain users of StarPanel who are the only person 
accessing a patient's record in that week, while other users are connected to a very large 
number of other users.  In the week of April 23rd, 118 users (1.8% of the users during the 
week) were the only users accessing a specific patient's record, and 95 users (1.5% of 
user) only accessed records that one other person accessed.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, one highly connected person had rules with 2,584 other users.
When we look at the same measurement at the department level, the number of 
rules per department in a week, we do not find any clear distribution.  Nonetheless, the 
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average number of relationships for each department was 98, with a median of 88.
Figure 14: Rules per user for the week starting April 23, 2006. This distribution is  
consistent with the distributions seen for the other 20 weeks in our study period.
We can speculate the nature of types of accesses for both ends of this distribution. 
For the records that were accessed a single time, the user may have been accessing the 
record for a retrospective chart review or renewing a patient's prescription.  Alternatively, 
the low access count could be an artifact of how we split the data into weeks; for 
example, the physician could be writing a clinical note on a Sunday when the patient had 
been discharged on Saturday.  In future work, we can investigate if splitting the data on a 
weekly is the cause by exploring larger time periods.  Patients who receive a much larger 
number of accesses are most likely actively being cared for by multiple clinicians.
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Rule Decay
We now know the basic distributions of how many patients a user or department 
accesses, as well as how many rules those users and departments are involved in, but 
these distributions tell us nothing about how the relational network evolves over time.  At 
one extreme, we can imagine an HCO that has a static relational network due to 
extremely consistent behavior of all parties over time. For example, a theoretical practice 
with 2 doctors and 3 nurses will likely be extremely stable over time as long as no one 
leaves the practice, since on average the 3 nurses will likely interact with the 2 doctors 
consistently, and the 2 doctors will likely have independent sets of patients they treat.  At 
the other extreme, we can imagine an HCO that has an extremely dynamic relational 
network.  The dynamic nature of this HCO could be caused by having a large number of 
clinicians and by having multiple clinicians who can all perform roughly the same job. 
Since multiple people are essentially interchangeable, the possible combinations of care 
paths increases dramatically.  It is important to note that we are not suggesting that 
clinicians are commodities, but rather that as the number of qualified clinicians in the 
organization increases, the probability of a patient being assigned to a specific clinician 
decreases.  
To learn how static or dynamic VUMC is, we wish to find the number of weeks a 
given rule exists during our 21-week study period.  A rule that appears for all 21 weeks 
shows that those two users or two departments accessed records in common each week. 
The more rules that exist for all 21 weeks, the more evidence we have for a stable 
organization structure.  If rules exist for only a few of the 21 weeks, we have more 
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evidence that there are organization changes.
We can visualize this stability using a decay curve, as seen in Figure 15.  For rules 
at the user level, 56% exist for only a single week.  Less than 1% of  the rules exist for at 
least 14 weeks and only 0.07% of the rules exist for the entire study period.  This high 
decay in how long rules last has several possible causes, including the possibility that the 
organization is changing rapid or simply that departments do not interact every week.  
We know that VUMC is a large academic medical center, in which residents rotate 
through different clinical areas and in which care is not so much delivered by specific 
individuals but rather by care teams.  Therefore, we can look at abstractions of the users 
to see if the delivery is by similar clinicians.  For example, is it important that any 
anesthesiologist treats a patient, or must a specific anesthesiologist treat the patient? 
Since the only practical abstraction dataset we obtained is the department information, we 
use the abstraction of the user into his or her department.
When we abstract to the department level, we see a much slower rate of decay of 
the rules (Figure 15).  Instead of the 44% drop after one week at the user level, the 
department level only had a 17% drop. While the department level still decays, the decay 
is much slower, such that 50% of the rules still remain at 7 weeks.  Over 16% of rules 
exist the entire 21-week study period.  This 16% represents a consistent and highly stable 
set of rules, which could be one group of rules to focus on when building an access 
control system or auditing system.
The highly dynamic nature of VUMC indicates that even at the abstracted level, 
any statistical model used for access control or auditing would need to be re-tuned or 
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regenerated on a fairly regular basis using the latest access data.
Figure 15: Decay of rules over time. 16% of the department rules existed for all 21-
weeks of the study, while only 0.07% of the user rules lasted that long. 
Sample Rules
We can examine a subset of these rules that HORNET generates from the 
StarPanel access logs to gain perspective on what the probabilities look like.  We will 
look at just the department-level rules, since the user-level rules are de-identified and 
therefore lacking any context.  Additionally, the department-level rules are much more 
stable, therefore more likely to be used by any anomaly detection system.
For our 21-week study period, we generated a total of 58,415 department-
department rules in the form of pair and conditional probabilities of those departments 
accessing the records of the same patients.  
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High Conditional Probability Rules
The rules with the highest conditional probabilities, in which we have the 
probability of one department given some other department, as shown in Table 4, 
occurred for only a small part of the 21-week period (1 to 2 weeks).  Most high 
conditional probability rules occur for a very short time—it is not until the 184th highest 
conditional probability rule that we see a rule that occurred for all 21 weeks of the study 
period.  Therefore, we will use a simple filter to try to obtain rules with some 
permanence.  If we only look at rules that occur for at least three weeks, we will 
eliminate any accesses that occurs in a single work session.  Two weeks is too short since 
users can access the system across our arbitrary week-long periods, for example a shift 
that spans Saturday evening and Sunday morning would count as 2 weeks.  An alternative 
would be to use a sliding window approach instead of our strict 7-day splits.  Applying 
this exclusion criteria, we obtain Table 5, which has the highest conditional probability 
rules that occurred for at least 3 weeks of our 21-week study period.  We see rules that are 
intuitive, such as the 0.378 probability of the Nephrology Clinic accessing a patient who 
was also accessed by the Hypertension Clinic. This result is intuitive since nephrology, 
the branch of internal medicine that focuses on the kidneys, often deals with kidney 
diseases that include hypertension, so we expect overlap between these two departments.
High Pair Probability Rules
While the rules with the highest conditional probabilities often do not appear for 
the full study period, the rules with the highest pair probabilities last for the entire study 
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period (Table 6).  Since the pair probability represents the frequency a specific rule, we 
expect departments who traditionally see many patients at the top of the list of high pair 
probability rules.  This expectation is validated by the departments in Table 6, such as the 
Emergency Medicine department.  Furthermore, in Table 6 there are multiple rules where 
the antecedent is the same as the consequent.  In this case, we are seeing the fact that 
people within the department are working very frequently with other people in that same 
department—a logical occurrence.  These top 20 rules form a large proportion of the total 
number of rules in the 21-week study period, for example the “Emergency Medicine – 
Emergency Medicine” rule accounts for nearly 6.5% of all 58,415 rules detected in our 
study period.  While a large number of the high pair probability rules are for the same 
department, some have different departments such as the rule between the 
Allergy/Pulm/Critical Care department and Emergency Medicine department, which 
represents 1.3% of all the rules.
Low Conditional Probability Rules
Just as we can see inherent organizational structure in the rules with the highest 
conditional and pair probabilities, we can also see this structure in the rules with the 
lowest conditional and pair probabilities.  The rules with the lowest conditional 
probabilities (Table 7), applying the same 3-week minimum criterion, show department 
combinations that have low pair probabilities.  The Emergency Medicine department is a 
common antecedent for many of these rules, since the Emergency Medicine department is 
connected to so many other departments (we are seeing the Emergency Medicine 
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department's role as a triage point into the hospital). 
Low Pair Probability Rules
While the rules with the lowest conditional probabilities should likely be excluded 
when building a probabilistic model of VUMC, the rules with the lowest pair 
probabilities (Table 8) could possibly remain in the model.  A low pair probability does 
not necessarily indicate that the rule is noise, but rather that it merely does not occur a 
large number of times in the total body of 58,415 rules.
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Table 4: 20 Department Rules with Highest Conditional Probabilities.  Includes the average and standard deviation of the 
conditional, P(B|A), and pair, P(A, B), probabilities over the 21 one-week periods. The “Weeks” column refers to how many of the 
one-week periods that rule appeared in. The department labels are from the clinician database.
A B
P(B|A)  P(A,B)
WeekAverage Std Dev Average Std Dev
Nuclear Med Housestaff Psychiatric Hosp at Vanderbilt 1 0 8.00E-06 0 1
VMG Bus Ofc Provider Enrollmnt Pediatric Cardiology 1 0 5.06E-06 0 1
Ctr of Occupational & Env Med Trauma 0.69 0.31 7.00E-06 9.96E-07 2
VCOEM Trauma 0.69 0.31 7.00E-06 9.96E-07 2
Ctr for Molecular Neuroscience Internal Medicine 0.5 0 1.90E-06 0 1
Psychology & Human Devel Psychiatric Hosp at Vanderbilt 0.5 0 8.22E-06 0 1
Ctr for Molecular Neuroscience Medicine 0.5 0 1.90E-06 0 1
VMG Bus Ofc Provider Enrollmnt Pediatric Urology 0.5 0 2.64E-06 0 1
Nursing Education & Developmen Rheumatology 0.5 0 1.92E-05 0 1
Computer Administration Vanderbilt Home Care 0.5 0 1.60E-05 0 1
Nursing Education & Developmen Rheumatology Clinic 0.5 0 1.92E-05 0 1
Human & Organizational Dev School Of Nursing 0.4 0.23 3.60E-05 1.87E-05 7
Hypertension Clinic Nephrology Clinic 0.38 0.17 4.16E-05 2.02E-05 3
VMG Bus Ofc Correspondence The Learning Center 0.33 0.47 5.71E-06 3.72E-06 3
VMG Bus Ofc Fees Group Strategy & Transformation 0.33 0 8.00E-06 0 1
VMG Bus Ofc Fees Group Admissions Office 0.33 0 8.23E-06 0 1
VMG Bus Ofc Fees Group Diabetes/Endocrinology 0.33 0 1.64E-05 0 1
VMG Bus Ofc Provider Enrollmnt Liver Transplant 0.25 0.25 3.99E-06 1.35E-06 2
Ctr of Occupational & Env Med Nephrology & Hypertension 0.25 0 8.33E-06 0 1
Radiology Administration VMG - Franklin 0.25 0 5.01E-06 0 1
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Table 5: 20 Department Rules with Highest Conditional Probability That Existed at Least 3 Weeks.  Includes the average and 
standard deviation of the conditional, P(B|A), and pair, P(A, B), probabilities over the 21 one-week periods. The “Weeks” column 
refers to how many of the one-week periods that rule appeared in. The department labels are from the clinician database.
A B
P(B|A)  P(A,B)
WeekAverage Std Dev Average Std Dev
Human & Organizational Dev School Of Nursing 4.04E-01 2.28E-01 3.60E-05 1.87E-05 7
Hypertension Clinic Nephrology Clinic 3.78E-01 1.73E-01 4.16E-05 2.02E-005 3
VMG Bus Ofc Correspondence The Learning Center 3.35E-01 4.70E-01 5.71E-06 3.72E-06 3
VMG Bus Ofc Fees Group Ofc of Compliance & Corp Integ 2.46E-01 1.84E-01 7.94E-06 2.21E-07 4
Main OR - Rollup VMG - Franklin 1.94E-01 8.02E-02 5.94E-05 3.07E-05 6
Psychology & Human Devel Mental Health Center 1.92E-01 7.55E-02 7.74E-06 4.77E-06 7
Human & Organizational Dev Univ Comm Health Services 1.50E-01 7.84E-02 1.13E-05 4.94E-06 7
Main OR - Rollup Spring Hill WIC 1.24E-01 5.90E-02 3.94E-05 2.12E-05 6
VMG Bus Ofc Fees Group Internal Medicine 1.22E-01 1.50E-01 5.32E-06 2.06E-06 3
Radiology-Housestaff Orthopaedics & Rehab 1.19E-01 1.00E-01 2.12E-05 1.23E-05 10
VMG Bus Ofc Fees Group School Of Nursing 1.12E-01 7.83E-02 6.25E-06 2.58E-06 3
Radiology-Housestaff Ob-Gyn 1.08E-01 6.60E-02 3.12E-05 1.95E-05 3
Pediatric Services Development Neuro-Peds 1.06E-01 1.21E-01 4.52E-06 1.65E-06 3
Radiology Administration Anesthesiology 1.06E-01 1.24E-01 6.19E-06 2.27E-06 9
VMG Bus Ofc Provider Enrollmnt Neurosurgery 1.02E-01 1.66E-01 1.20E-05 9.12E-06 14
Psychology & Human Devel Psychiatry 1.02E-01 7.69E-02 3.16E-06 1.38E-06 7
Psychology & Human Devel Orthopaedics & Rehab 9.41E-02 1.10E-01 2.00E-06 8.48E-07 3
Psychology & Human Devel Emergency Medicine 9.41E-02 1.10E-01 2.00E-06 8.48E-07 3
Institute of Imaging Science Emergency Medicine 9.28E-02 1.33E-01 8.90E-05 5.53E-05 11
Junior League Unit Pediatric Endocrinology 9.16E-02 1.02E-01 2.11E-04 1.28E-04 19
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Table 6: 20 Department Rules with the Highest Pair Probabilities.  Includes the average and standard deviation of the 
conditional, P(B|A), and pair, P(A, B), probabilities over the 21 one-week periods. The “Weeks” column refers to how many of the 
one-week periods that rule appeared in. The department labels are from the clinician database.
A B
P(B|A)  P(A,B)
WeekAverage Std Dev Average Std Dev
Emergency Medicine Emergency Medicine 6.47E-04 4.69E-05 6.48E-02 8.97E-03 21
Ophthalmology Ophthalmology 3.36E-03 6.43E-04 2.85E-02 4.68E-03 21
Ob-Gyn Ob-Gyn 1.55E-03 1.69E-04 2.69E-02 2.94E-03 21
Orthopaedics & Rehab Orthopaedics & Rehab 1.47E-03 1.72E-04 2.06E-02 2.93E-03 21
Pediatric Hematology Pediatric Hematology 4.28E-03 4.89E-04 2.06E-02 2.53E-03 21
Emergency Medicine Emergency Med-Housestaff 1.75E-04 3.49E-05 1.73E-02 2.63E-03 21
Emergency Med-Housestaff Emergency Medicine 2.56E-03 3.52E-04 1.73E-02 2.63E-03 21
School Of Nursing School Of Nursing 1.83E-03 1.93E-04 1.70E-02 1.32E-03 21
Hematology/Oncology Hematology/Oncology 2.01E-03 3.51E-04 1.59E-02 2.51E-03 21
Univ Comm Health Services School Of Nursing 5.08E-03 1.07E-03 1.44E-02 1.72E-03 21
School Of Nursing Univ Comm Health Services 1.56E-03 2.20E-04 1.44E-02 1.72E-03 21
Pediatric Cardiology Pediatric Cardiology 2.71E-03 2.88E-04 1.43E-02 2.51E-03 21
Orthopaedics & Rehab Emergency Medicine 1.02E-03 1.08E-04 1.42E-02 1.59E-03 21
Emergency Medicine Orthopaedics & Rehab 1.44E-04 2.10E-05 1.42E-02 1.59E-03 21
School Of Nursing Ob-Gyn 1.42E-03 1.89E-04 1.32E-02 1.60E-03 21
Ob-Gyn School Of Nursing 7.63E-04 1.05E-04 1.32E-02 1.60E-03 21
Emergency Medicine Pediatrics-Housestaff 1.32E-04 3.30E-05 1.30E-02 2.84E-03 21
Pediatrics-Housestaff Emergency Medicine 2.49E-03 3.18E-04 1.30E-02 2.84E-03 21
Cardiovascular Medicine Cardiovascular Medicine 1.58E-03 1.67E-04 1.30E-02 2.42E-03 21
Allergy/Pulm/Critical Care Emergency Medicine 1.62E-03 1.98E-04 1.30E-02 1.55E-03 21
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Table 7: 20 Department Rules with the Lowest Conditional Probabilities That Existed at Least 3 Weeks.  Includes the average and 
standard deviation of the conditional, P(B|A), and pair, P(A, B), probabilities over the 21 one-week periods. The “Weeks” column 
refers to how many of the one-week periods that rule appeared in. The department labels are from the clinician database.
A B
P(B|A)  P(A,B)
WeekAverage Std Dev Average Std Dev
Emergency Medicine 4 S GYN Holding/PACU 2.25E-08 6.69E-09 2.31E-06 7.38E-07 5
Emergency Medicine Kennedy Center 2.29E-08 1.07E-08 2.00E-06 8.48E-07 3
Emergency Medicine Psychology & Human Devel 2.29E-08 1.07E-08 2.00E-06 8.48E-07 3
Emergency Medicine Cardiology 7N 2.35E-08 1.22E-08 2.40E-06 1.21E-06 9
Emergency Medicine Pulmonary Clinic 2.93E-08 1.36E-08 2.73E-06 1.24E-06 4
Emergency Medicine Admin MH Clinic 3.78E-08 2.13E-08 3.42E-06 2.05E-06 4
Emergency Medicine Office Of Research 4.34E-08 5.77E-09 4.06E-06 3.24E-08 5
Emergency Medicine NICU 5.09E-08 3.23E-08 5.00E-06 2.83E-06 9
Emergency Medicine Worklife Connections -EAP 8.32E-08 1.01E-08 8.11E-06 7.63E-08 3
Emergency Medicine Vanderbilt Oncology 8.54E-08 4.18E-08 8.07E-06 4.26E-06 4
Emergency Medicine Radiology Administration 9.24E-08 6.30E-08 1.02E-05 8.25E-06 8
Emergency Medicine Sedation Service 9.55E-08 6.67E-08 1.05E-05 8.78E-06 7
The Learning Center Law School Deans Office 9.97E-08 2.63E-08 1.97E-06 7.44E-07 6
The Learning Center University Library 9.97E-08 2.63E-08 1.97E-06 7.44E-07 6
Anesthesiology Admin MH Clinic 1.03E-07 1.43E-08 1.58E-06 3.54E-08 5
Emergency Medicine Urology/Pediatric Surgical Sci 1.10E-07 7.09E-08 9.56E-06 5.96E-06 4
Emergency Medicine Special Procedures 1.12E-07 9.95E-08 1.02E-05 8.08E-06 8
Emergency Medicine Ob/Gyn Practice 1.13E-07 7.08E-08 1.19E-05 7.98E-06 13
Emergency Medicine Med Ethics 1.13E-07 7.95E-08 1.06E-05 6.43E-06 11
Emergency Medicine VIPPS 1.14E-07 8.39E-08 1.12E-05 7.93E-06 17
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Table 8: 20 Department Rules with the Lowest Pair Probabilities That Existed at Least 3 Weeks.  Includes the average and 
standard deviation of the conditional, P(B|A), and pair, P(A, B), probabilities over the 21 one-week periods. The “Weeks” column 
refers to how many of the one-week periods that rule appeared in. The department labels are from the clinician database.
A B
P(B|A)  P(A,B)
WeekAverage Std Dev Average Std Dev
Nursing Support Services 7-S  MICU 1.18E-05 3.61E-06 5.11E-07 1.78E-07 3
7-S  MICU Nursing Support Services 1.37E-06 6.90E-07 5.11E-07 1.78E-07 3
9S General Surgery Special Procedures 4.45E-06 2.17E-06 5.81E-07 4.52E-09 3
9S General Surgery Hematology/Stem Cell Clinic 4.45E-06 2.17E-06 5.81E-07 4.52E-09 3
Special Procedures 9S General Surgery 4.98E-04 4.78E-04 5.81E-07 4.52E-09 3
Hematology/Stem Cell Clinic 9S General Surgery 1.67E-06 1.64E-07 5.81E-07 4.52E-09 3
9S General Surgery Radiology Administration 4.23E-06 1.91E-06 5.82E-07 4.91E-09 4
Radiology Administration 9S General Surgery 3.56E-04 4.66E-04 5.82E-07 4.91E-09 4
Nursing Support Services SICU 1.42E-05 3.39E-06 6.48E-07 3.72E-07 3
SICU Nursing Support Services 8.07E-06 7.40E-06 6.48E-07 3.72E-07 3
Asthma/Sinus/Allergy Prog SICU 7.94E-05 2.60E-05 6.74E-07 1.07E-08 4
SICU Asthma/Sinus/Allergy Prog 5.00E-06 1.30E-06 6.74E-07 1.07E-08 4
Special Procedures Nursing Support Services 4.46E-04 4.24E-04 6.86E-07 1.82E-07 4
Hematology/Stem Cell Clinic Nursing Support Services 2.08E-06 7.39E-07 6.86E-07 1.82E-07 4
Nursing Support Services Special Procedures 1.12E-05 2.75E-06 6.86E-07 1.82E-07 4
Myelosuppresion (11N) Nursing Support Services 9.48E-06 1.72E-06 6.86E-07 1.82E-07 4
Nursing Support Services Myelosuppresion (11N) 1.12E-05 2.75E-06 6.86E-07 1.82E-07 4
Nursing Support Services Hematology/Stem Cell Clinic 1.12E-05 2.75E-06 6.86E-07 1.82E-07 4
9S General Surgery SICU 3.72E-06 2.08E-06 7.03E-07 3.36E-07 4
SICU 9S General Surgery 8.48E-06 6.45E-06 7.03E-07 3.36E-07 4
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Discussion
In this chapter we demonstrated our use of HORNET to generate a statistical 
model of how VUMC operates from the access logs of its electronic medical record 
system.  This model includes a wide range of access patterns—from heavy users to 
occasional users, from patients who are rarely accessed to patients who are commonly 
accessed. We also provided some justification for who these users are in relation to their 
access patterns.  Additionally, our results show that VUMC is a dynamic organization, 
but we see greater stability when we model the users in terms of their department 
affiliations.
This model and the specific results from our 21-week study period are not the 
major finding in this chapter.  The major finding in this chapter is that our tool, 
HORNET, can effectively and efficiently generate a probabilistic model of a Healthcare 
Organization from the access logs of that organization's information system.  This tool 
seamlessly incorporates any meta-information about the organization, such as human-
resource type data, even if that data is less than ideal.  Furthermore, it is important to 
realize that the specific results in this chapter, such as the rules, are not meant to be 
applicable at any other organization or even at VUMC today, three and a half years after 
this data set was collected—especially given the rate of decay of rules.  This lack of 
current applicability or applicability to other organizations does not mean the results are 
not reproducible.  Far from it, with our open source HORNET tool, any organization is 
able to generate a customized statistical model of itself.
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Limitations
While we successfully built a model from StarPanel's access logs, we do have 
several limitations—some related to our approach and some related to the realities of 
working with production data in a way that was never intended.
From our perspective, the biggest limitation is from our co-opting of production 
data and use of it in ways for which is was never designed.  Having complete, consistent, 
accurate, and clean meta-information on all users in the system would be very beneficial. 
In addition to using the department meta-information, we could also use roles.  We 
believe that the combination of role and department would have made a very compelling 
statistical model (for example, do attending physicians in one department always work 
with charge nurses in some other department?). Alas, we are unable to find the “perfect” 
source of meta-information.  Due to the nature of what various administrators were trying 
to model, we know of at least 4 distinct sources of partial meta-information.  The first 
source is a database collected to keep track of the medical residents.  Since the residents 
often rotate through different care areas in the organization, this database does not 
contain information of what department or care area each resident is in or what time they 
were in that area.  The second source is designed to allow customization of experience 
within StarPanel based on a self-selected role—unfortunately, a majority of users never 
customize their experience. A third source, while containing department information, 
lacks any key to which we could link the users in this source to the users in the access 
logs.  Additionally, this third source holds different department labels than the primary 
meta-information source we use.  We do not wish to perform a mapping between the two 
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sets of labels (while linking “Emergency Medicine” to “Emergency Med” is 
straightforward, there are cases in which we lack the domain knowledge to make an 
informed match).  We doubt this is an issue that is specific to VUMC—the effort to create 
and maintain a complete meta-information source often outweighs the potential benefits 
of such a database.
Interestingly, this is an issue that any role-based security system in healthcare 
must itself confront.  Due to the lack of complete, centralized knowledge about who users 
are, any role-based security system must first undertake the monumental task of creating 
and maintaining such a database.  While a probabilistic anomaly detection system based 
upon the work presented in this document would ideally have such a complete source of 
meta-information, a detection system using HORNET could be greedy and take whatever 
various sources are available.  For example, we could generate one model based upon the 
resident database and apply it to detect anomalies for only the residents, then use a more 
standard employee database to detect anomalies for only those employees.  This greedy 
approach would allow HCO administrators to more quickly and cheaply deploy an 
anomaly detection system, since the complete meta-information database would never 
have to be created.
For this study, we ignore a significant portion of the accesses when abstracting the 
model to the department level, since we lack department information for a large number 
of our users. While less than ideal, we believe that the exclusion does not negatively 
affect the model.  We believe so because the users with departments account for a larger 
portion of the accesses and the two groups (those with and without departments) are, as 
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we showed, indistinguishable in their access patterns.
While the lack of complete meta-information is the biggest limitation of this 
study, we have several limitations specific to our modeling technique.  For one, we only 
build the relational networks for one week periods, instead of trying to vary the period 
size or define periods as the length of individual stays in the hospital based on admission 
and discharge. We noticed a strong 7-day periodicity in the data (Figure 10), and chose a 
logical default value.
Another limitation is that we perform only a single type of weighting on the 
relationships, when there are several additional logical ways to weight the relationships. 
We do weight the relationships based upon how many other relationships a user is 
involved in, such that the relationship for a user who has only a single relationship is 
stronger that a relationship for a user who has relationships with 100 other users.  In 
addition to this style of weighting, we can discount patients who are accessed by a large 
number of users, using a weighting system similar to term frequency-inverse document 
frequency that is commonly found in information retrieval.
We could also weight the rules by strength (either conditional or pair probability), 
allowing us to understand if important rules disappear or if the important rules last all 21 
weeks (Figure 15).
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CHAPTER VI
SURVEY OF EXPERT UNDERSTANDING OF ORGANIZATION
In the previous chapter, we evaluated a simple, yet powerful, method for 
obtaining a statistical model how clinicians interact via patients' medical records. This 
model represents actual clinician usage of the medical record system and can be the basis 
for automatically defining a security policy to restrict access to medical records or detect 
possible improper accesses.  Traditional methods for defining the security policies rely 
upon organizational experts manually defining these policies.  Since our model offers a 
potential replacement or supplement to these traditional methods, we wish to understand 
how well experts perform at characterizing how the organization delivers care.  To 
compare the HORNET data mining approach, we administered a pilot, which 
demonstrates the benefits of automatically mining access control and lays the 
groundwork for a more thorough study on the subject.
Survey Methods
Survey Design
This preliminary survey is designed to test the null hypothesis that experts are 
good at approximating the conditional probability of two departments caring for the same 
patients, a task necessary for manually building access control policies.  To test this 
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hypothesis, we randomly select 3 departments from the set of rules presented in the 
previous chapter: the SICU, Ob-Gyn, and the Nephrology & Hypertension departments. 
For each of these 3 departments, we select 10 rules in which the department is the 
antecedent in the conditional probability, therefore creating a total of 30 rules (as shown 
in Table 9, along with the conditional and pair probabilities). Each set of 10 rules is from 
a cross section of the conditional probability distribution of rules involving the 
antecedent, such that we pick roughly one rule from every 10th percentile (e.g. ~99th 
percentile, ~90th percentile, ~80th percentile, etc.).  Additionally, all the rules occur for at 
least 16 weeks in our 22 week study period.  We arbitrarily set the 16 week limit to 
ensure that all the rules in the survey consistently occur within the organization. For each 
of the 30 rules we attach a 1-to-5 Likert-scale question, for example: 
“If a patient is seen by the 'SICU' department, how likely is that patient to be 
seen by the '5N CVICU' department?”
In an introduction to the survey (Appendix A), we ask the survey participants to 
rate each statement on a 1 to 5 scale based upon their own knowledge of the organization, 
where 5 indicates they think it is very likely and 1 indicates they think it is unlikely. If 
experts are good at defining the conditional probabilities, we would expect to see high 
scores for rules with high conditional probabilities, and low scores for rules with low 
conditional probabilities. 
Administration
Using the RedCap Survey system we included an introduction, the 30 rules and 
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their Likert scale choices, and an optional comments box, in a web-based survey, using 
the RedCap Survey tool (52). We solicited responses from 15 attending physicians at 
VUMC.  These physicians have appointments in a variety of departments including 
Internal Medicine, Emergency Medicine, and various Intensive Care Units.  We used the 
RedCap system to email the survey to the individuals and anonymously collect responses. 
We received 7 responses over the course of one month, resulting in a 44% response rate.
Analysis
To test our hypothesis, we try to find a linear correlation between the conditional 
probabilities of the 30 rules against the average score of the respondents.  If a correlation 
exists, we can assume that the experts agreed with the probabilistic model that HORNET 
generated.  If no correlation or a very poor correlation exists, we question the ability of 
human experts to document how the organization works.  Additionally, we assess for 
inter-rater agreement using Fleiss' kappa (53) and look at the deviation for each survey 
question.  We use Fleiss' kappa instead of the more traditional Cohen's kappa since the 
survey has multiple choices for each question and we wish to compare all respondents. 
One weakness of using Fleiss' kappa is that we treat the Likert scale as a categorical 
variable instead of an ordinal value.  Thus we lose the context that a response of 4 is more 
similar to 3 or 5 than it is to 1 or 2.  Therefore, to supplement Fleiss' kappa, we examine 
the deviation of the respondents' compared to the mean.
 It is important to note that results of the survey are not sufficiently powered to 
make any formal claims.  Yet, as a pilot study, it can provide suggestions of possible 
58
results and directions for future, more powerful studies.
Results
We can see the descriptive statistics of how the 7 respondents answered each 
question in Table 9 along with the probabilities that HORNET computed. From this data, 
we can compute the inter-rater agreement.  For all three antecedent groups (SICU, Ob-
Gyn, and Nephrology & Hypertension), Fleiss' kappa showed there was only slight 
agreement between the raters (54), since all three had kappa values in the range of 0.11 to 
0.18.   The SICU group had a kappa of 0.11, the Ob-Gyn group had a kappa of 0.18, and 
the Nephrology & Hypertension group had a kappa of 0.16. However, by using Fleiss' 
kappa we are treating the responses as categorical data instead of ordinal data, so we lose 
the context of the Likert scale.  If we examine the raw standard deviations we see that 20 
of the 30 response standard deviations are less than 1 step in the Likert scale.  Examining 
the standard deviations suggests that, while not strong, there is at least a degree of 
agreement between the raters.
Since we wish to understand if there is a correlation between the Percentile of 
P(B|A) and the Survey Response for each department pair, we try to fit a linear model to 
the data. Plotting the Percentile of the conditional probability of the rules against the 
Survey Response (Figure 16), yields a very poor result.  We expect that for increasing 
conditional probabilities (represented by the increasing percentile) we should see an 
increase in the expert's belief in the likelihood of the relationship between the 
departments.  However, as Figure 16 shows, only the Nephrology & Hypertension has a 
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successful linear fit, even though it is a poor fit with a R2 value of 0.38.
Figure 16: Survey Responses versus Conditional Percentile.
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Table 9: Survey Results
A B
Probabilistic Model Survey Response
P(B|A) P(A,B) Weeks
Percentile
of P(B|A) Mean Std Dev
Coefficient 
of Variance Median
SICU Trauma PCC 1.90E-03 2.04E-04 20 100 2.86 1.07 0.71 3
SICU 7-S  MICU 3.14E-04 3.36E-05 21 90.56 2 0.58 1 2
SICU Allergy/Pulmonary/Critical Care 1.84E-03 1.86E-04 21 99.57 2.29 0.76 1.14 2
SICU Transplant Center 2.76E-04 3.14E-05 21 89.7 3.14 1.35 0.79 3
SICU Diabetes/Endocrinology 1.19E-04 1.34E-05 20 78.97 2.86 1.21 0.71 3
SICU Neurology 8.16E-05 8.65E-06 21 69.53 2.43 0.79 0.81 2
SICU TVC PreAdmit Testing 5.41E-05 5.59E-06 19 58.8 4 0.82 0.8 4
SICU Psychiatry 3.59E-05 4.07E-06 18 45.92 2.14 0.69 0.71 2
SICU 5N CVICU 2.94E-05 3.05E-06 17 35.62 3.29 0.76 0.82 3
SICU Neuro-Sleep Disorders 2.13E-05 2.51E-06 17 27.04 1.86 0.38 0.93 2
Ob-Gyn Anesthesiology 1.70E-04 2.97E-03 21 98.21 4.29 0.76 0.86 4
Ob-Gyn Pediatric Cardiology 4.59E-05 7.93E-04 21 89.96 1.71 0.95 1.71 1
Ob-Gyn Plastic Surgery 1.76E-05 3.08E-04 21 79.57 2.14 0.69 0.71 2
Ob-Gyn Pediatric Critical Care 8.77E-06 1.53E-04 21 69.53 1.43 0.79 1.43 1
Ob-Gyn Pediatric Urology 3.74E-06 6.68E-05 20 59.5 1.86 1.21 1.86 1
Ob-Gyn Trauma PCC 2.36E-06 4.23E-05 21 49.82 2 0.58 0.67 2
Ob-Gyn Pain Center 1.63E-06 2.72E-05 20 39.78 3 0.58 1 3
Ob-Gyn 5S PICU 9.38E-07 1.62E-05 20 25.09 1.29 0.49 1.29 1
Ob-Gyn Asthma/Sinus/Allergy Program 6.96E-07 1.25E-05 17 19 2.29 0.95 0.57 2
Ob-Gyn Nursing Support Services 3.72E-07 6.42E-06 18 8.24 4 1 1 4
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Table 9, continued
A B
Probabilistic Model Survey Response
P(B|A) P(A,B) Weeks
Percentile
of P(B|A) Mean Std Dev
Coefficient 
of Variance Median
Nephrology & Hypertension Emergency Medicine 1.65E-03 1.16E-02 21 100 4.14 1.07 0.83 4
Nephrology & Hypertension Allergy/Pulmonary/Critical Care 4.81E-04 3.38E-03 21 99.3 3 1.15 0.75 3
Nephrology & Hypertension Renal Transplant 9.37E-05 6.40E-04 21 89.08 3.57 1.27 0.89 4
Nephrology & Hypertension Neonatology 3.84E-05 2.61E-04 21 79.23 1.29 0.49 1.29 1
Nephrology & Hypertension Oncology/Hematology 2.02E-05 1.39E-04 21 68.31 2.43 0.79 0.81 3
Nephrology & Hypertension Psychiatry 1.12E-05 7.89E-05 21 59.86 2.43 0.98 0.61 2
Nephrology & Hypertension Oral Surgery 6.31E-06 4.57E-05 20 49.65 2 1 0.5 2
Nephrology & Hypertension Pediatric Emergency 3.92E-06 2.63E-05 19 38.38 1.71 1.25 1.71 1
Nephrology & Hypertension Cardiac Cath Lab 2.37E-06 1.61E-05 16 28.17 2.86 0.9 0.71 3
Nephrology & Hypertension Student Health & Wellness 1.57E-06 1.14E-05 16 19.37 1.43 0.79 1.43 1
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Discussion
From these results, we can draw two preliminary conclusions: first, human 
domain experts perform poorly at manually building a probabilistic model of how the 
medical center operates, and second, the agreement between experts is less than ideal, 
thus raising questions of how one would ever correctly pick experts if manually building 
such a model.  We believe that the poor expert performance indicates the superiority of a 
computational approach to generate this type of organizational model of the organization. 
However, we believe that the use of our approach in addition to using experts in tasks 
they are more suited for, such as defining policies like “a user should not access a 
coworker's record,” will perform better than our approach alone.  As stated previously, 
the survey was not fully powered, thus we believe that further, more thorough studies 
should be conducted to validate this preliminary results.
While the results are interesting in that they suggest the need to use a tool such as 
HORNET to build a probabilistic model of the organization as compared to the 
traditional, human-based method of building intrusion detection rules or access control 
policies, they do have two possible flaws.  
The first possible flaw is in the survey instrument.  While we performed several 
iterations of survey development and testing, multiple respondents indicated in the free 
response section that it was difficult to think through what the survey was asking for.  We 
attempted to model the survey on the task that an administrator would have to conduct in 
order to build policies for access control or intrusion detection.  Improvements can likely 
be made to clarify the survey device, but we believe that the respondents' difficulty in 
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completing the survey indicates the inherent difficulty of using humans to quantitatively 
characterize how a complex organization works.
The second flaw is related to the issue first discussed in the previous chapter 
about the secondary use of meta-information data sources.  Several respondents indicated 
that they were unsure of what the department labels referred to.  It is likely that at least 
some of the department labels serve an administrative purpose that most clinicians would 
be unaware of.  For example “Nursing Support Services” refers to an administrative 
department label, but would any practicing clinician know who is part of this department? 
This flaw helps to further advance our previous arguments that complete and accurate 
meta-information databases should be built to provide this information universally and 
that traditional methods would run into the same issue. This flaw also demonstrates the 
superiority of computational approaches to building the model using a bottom up 
approach instead of what a manual, human based system would perform.
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION & FUTURE WORK
In the previous chapters, we introduced an open-source tool for building access 
logs into a relational network, from which we can obtain a statistical model of how a 
healthcare organization operates.  Using this tool, we successfully demonstrated its use 
on access logs from StarPanel, Vanderbilt University Medical Center's EMRS.  We 
additionally measured the performance of domain experts in building a similar statistical 
model.
This work comes at an opportune time in a field that has a major unsolved 
problem.  To date, healthcare organizations have been largely unsuccessful with 
implementing solutions that protect patient privacy against insider attacks.  Neither 
auditing nor access control has been truly deployed in HCOs, due to numerous issues of 
defining the models of what actions are and are not allowed.  These issues include human 
inability to characterize the models and natural, constant structural changes of the 
organization.  In spite of these issues, HCOs now have a mandate from the government to 
increase the adoption and security of electronic healthcare systems.  Our work provides a 
potential first step to a solution of these issues by automatically learning how the 
organization naturally operates.
Specifically, we have several contributions to the field.  First, and most 
importantly, is our Apache-licensed tool itself.  Administrators at other HCOs can now 
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conduct the same analysis using data from their own institution.  HORNET is also a 
platform that researchers and software developers can build on top of, taking advantage 
of the system's advanced plugin architecture, configuration system, and plugin chaining.
Second, we contribute an approach which makes the best of incomplete data.  Our 
findings suggest that we can successfully find meaningful results in spite of missing data. 
Existing methods of policy definitions would almost certainly need complete, accurate, 
and maintained data in order to function.  Our approach will accept whatever information 
is available about the organization.  However, we argue that for the best performance of 
any access control system or auditing system, administrators should work to assemble 
and maintain a complete, detailed, and accurate representation of the people who have 
access to health information systems.
Third, we provide pilot results of a survey that indicates the difficultly of using 
humans to manually define a statistical model for access control or auditing.   This is not 
to say that humans are not good at defining certain classes of rules, for example, that 
Ob/Gyn physicians should not look at male patients' medical records.  An ideal access 
control system would likely incorporate both humans and computer generated models—
leaving each to what it is best at.
While our work focuses on healthcare, specifically on electronic medical record 
systems, there is a wider applicability for this work.  Any system which logs a user 
accessing some resource could be modeled with our tool.  In the example at Vanderbilt, 
patients were this resource. A natural extension is examining Clinical Provider Order 
Entry (CPOE) systems' access logs or other types of HIS.  Even beyond the healthcare 
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realm, this approach and tool can be used to model use of web sites.
Next Steps
With the open-source distribution of our framework, the future of this work is 
open to the wishes of HCO administrators and researchers.  Specifically, we plan to 
continue to develop HORNET, by improving its core, adding plugins for different types 
of analysis, and developing a graphical user interface.
In each chapter, where we have indicated limitations of our existing methods, we 
can work to fix these inadequacies. We plan to experiment with period sizes other than 7 
days and with different methods of weighting relationships.  Additionally, we can use the 
temporal context of the access logs to generate probabilities that have a temporal 
meaning.  For example, we might expect that the Emergency Department sees patients 
before any other department.
If VUMC provides a complete source of meta-information about the users of 
StarPanel, including the users' department and role, we can make more specific statistical 
models.
We suspect that our model can be dramatically improved using several additional 
techniques and sources of information.  Using referrals within the organization we could 
confirm existing work patterns, which might confirm and allow tuning of our statistical 
model.  Additional improvements will likely result from incorporating a temporal view of 
the data (for example, we might expect the emergency medicine department to access 
records first, then some other department such as internal medicine or surgery). Our 
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model also only models pairwise relationships—the expansion of this into group 
detection using clustering techniques could provide more specific rules.
The most important next step in this work is incorporating the statistical model we 
dynamically generate into an access control system or into a retrospective auditing 
system.  We specifically plan to incorporate our system into Vanderbilt's Model-
Integrated Clinical Information System (MICIS) to define access control policies. 
Additionally, we plan to spike the access logs from our study period with known 
improper accesses to perform a retrospective audit.
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